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F.A.S. NEWSLETTER

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

SPECIAL ISSUE ON
SECRET INTELLIGENCE

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4 to \$6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business-as-usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? □

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700-million to \$1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council determines." (Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000300020004-7
italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly denied by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions . . ." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of knowing as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home; how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The dangers were only too evident to Kennedy of letting operations be conducted by those who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles insisted on a united operation, arguing that separation would be inefficient and disruptive. But there are many arguments on both sides and the issue deserves continuing consideration.

In particular, there is something to be said for deciding now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine operations). This would otherwise tend to institutionalize the notion that CIA itself is run by the organizers of clandestine activities rather than by those who do technical intelligence. Indeed, there is much to be said for a tradition of bringing in outside

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sides to change CIA.

The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget also deserves re-examination. It is being argued, in a citizen suit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appropriations of CIA in the budgets of other departments because the Constitution provides, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. (italics added).

Not only the CIA expenditures but the distorted budget reports of other agencies would seem to violate this provision. The petitioners call for a functional breakdown showing general categories of uses of CIA funds and a breakdown by nation showing where funds have been spent.

Certainly, there is little justification for hiding the total figure of CIA expenditures from the public and Congress. This figure reveals less to any potential enemy than the size of the Defense Department budget—which we freely reveal. Releasing at least this overall figure would make unnecessary the hiding of the CIA budget in other agency budgets. This would stop an authorization and appropriation procedure which systematically and perennially misleads Congress and the public.

Problems Posed by Clandestine Political Operations Abroad

CIA's four divisions concern themselves with Support Science and Technology, Intelligence, and Plans. Press reports suggest that the personnel in these divisions number, respectively, 6,000, 4,000, 2,000 and 6,000.

The Intelligence Division examines open and secret data and prepares economic, social, and political reports on situations.

It is in the Plans Division that clandestine operations are undertaken. Former Deputy Directors for Plans have been: Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Richard Bissel and, after 1962, Richard Helms—now the Director of the CIA.

Does the CIA Pressure Presidents?

The most dramatic clandestine operations obviously have the approval of the President. But as any bureaucrat knows, it can be hard for the President to say "no" to employees with dramatic ideas that are deeply felt.

The U-2 and Bay of Pigs operations—both under the guidance of Richard Bissel—reveal this phenomenon. In both cases, the President (first Eisenhower, then Kennedy) went along with the plan reluctantly. In both cases, the operation eventually embarrassed them greatly.

In the case of the U-2, President Eisenhower recalled saying: "If one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess." He often asked the CIA: What happens if you're caught? They would say: It hasn't happened yet.

But it was obvious that it would happen eventually. Indeed, two years after the 1960 crash, it was an agreed military estimate that Russian rockets could hit U-2s at 68,000 feet. And it was known that these U-2s could flare out. At what point would CIA itself have had the self-control to stop the flights?

Are the Repercussions Worth It?

We learned a great deal from the U-2 flights, though it was of much less direct significance to our security and tranquility than is commonly believed. The last U-2 flights still had not found any Soviet missiles other than test vehicles. But the information was too secret to be used even though it was known to the Russians. At home, missile gap was still a popular fear based on pencil and paper calculations of "capabilities" rather than "intentions or direct knowledge." Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000300020004-7

SPIRIT OF OSS LIVES ON

"The CIA," writes OSS veteran Francis Miller, "inherited from Donovan his lopsided and mischievous preoccupation with action and the Bay of Pigs was one of the results of that legacy." CIA men, like their OSS predecessors, have been imaginative, free-wheeling, aggressive, and often more politically knowledgeable than their State Department colleagues. And, like the men of Donovan's organization, CIA "spooks" abroad still resist headquarters' interference in their activities.

-- R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 362.

hopeful summit conference in 1960 and thus perpetuated dangerous tensions. Yet this was CIA's greatest clandestine success!

In the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the disaster was complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advocates and pressed it upon President Kennedy. According to some reports, they even led him to believe that the Eisenhower Administration had given the plan a go-ahead from which disengagement would be embarrassing. Once the invasion started, they pressed for more American involvement. The plan itself was, in retrospect, ludicrously ill-conceived. Despite the proximity of Cuba, intelligence about the likelihood of the necessary uprising was far too optimistic.

This failure had repercussions as well. It left the President feeling insecure and afraid that the Soviets thought him weak for not following through. It left the Soviets fearing an invasion of Cuba in due course. The stage was set for the missile crisis. Some believe that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was also encouraged by Kennedy's fear of being seen as too weak.

Clandestine political operations obviously have far-reaching political consequences no one can predict.

Is the Burden of Secrecy too Great?

The CIA recently brought suit against Victor Marchetti, a former employee, for not submitting to them for clearance a work of fiction about spying operations. It is evident that the CIA feared disclosures about clandestine operations or methods. The result was a "prior restraint" order without precedent in which Marchetti is precluded from publishing anything about CIA, fiction or not, without letting CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent against the traditional freedom of American press and publishing is now in the courts as a direct result of Government efforts to act abroad in ways which cannot be discussed at home. This is a clear example of the statement written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."

Must We Manipulate the Underdeveloped World?

For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA, a large institutionalized budget now sees little future in the developed world. In the developed free world, the stability of governments now makes political operations unnecessary. In the Communist developed world, these political operations are largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection by traditional techniques seems to have been relatively unsuccessful.

The penetration of CIA by the Soviet spy, Philby, is said to have left CIA with a total net negative balance of effectiveness for the years up to 1951. It completely destroyed the CIA's first "Bay of Pigs"—that effort to overthrow the Albanian Government in 1949 which cost the lives of 300 men.

The only really important clandestine Soviet source of information known publicly was Pankosky. The public

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literature really shows only one other triumph in penetrating Soviet secrecy with spics: the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. But this speech was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern European sources. Allen Dulles, on television, quipped this "one of the main coups of the time I was [at CIA]."

Compared to the Soviet Union, the underdeveloped world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The governments are relatively unstable and the societies provide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine operations, these operations are much harder to justify.

We are not at war—usually, not even at cold war—with the countries in the underdeveloped world. And they rarely if ever pose a direct threat to us, whether or not they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today, fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as a struggle between the forces of dark and light—a struggle in which we must influence every corner of the globe.

In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms recently said:

"America's intelligence assets (sic), however, do not exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat, or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The United States, as a world power, either is involved or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers."

Thus, where the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II was justified by a hot war, and the CIA by a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activities in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only from America's role as a "great power."

Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If information were all that were at issue, a strong case could be made for getting needed information when you need it, through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance. But if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one requires long-standing penetration of institutions of all kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant information necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.

Political Control of Agents in the Field

Because political operations are so sensitive and, potentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be under strict control. But is this really possible? To each foreign movement of one kind or another—no matter how distasteful—CIA will assign various operatives, if only to get information. In the process, these operatives must ingratiate themselves with the movement. And since they are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the movement that the United States likes it, or might support it.

Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are correctly interpreting U.S. policy—or what they think it should be—in delicate maneuvers which they control.

What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents told Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possible" to help if a coup were mounted. (See *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 6, 1972, "CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster.")

No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy will be insensitive to the problems to which these situations give rise. These problems would be dramatically diminished, however, if CIA were restricted to information gathering and were known to be. The movements would then cease to look to CIA for policy signals.

Alternative Controls on CIA

What alternative positions might be considered toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative possibilities:

1. Prohibit CIA operations and agents in the underdeveloped world. This would have the advantage of pro-

AGENTS LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION

Writing after the war of his negotiations for the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, Dulles cautiously suggested: "An intelligence officer in the field is supposed to keep his home office informed of what he is doing. That is quite true, but with some reservations, as he may overdo it. If, for example, he tells too much or asks too often for instructions, he is likely to get some he doesn't relish, and what is worse, he may well find headquarters trying to take over the whole conduct of the operation. Only a man on the spot can really pass judgment on the details as contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Dulles added, "It has always amazed me how desk personnel thousands of miles away seem to require wisdom and special knowledge about local field conditions which they assume goes deeper than that available to the man on the spot." Almost without exception, Dulles and other OSS operators feared the burden of a high-level decision that might cramp their freedom of action.

R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 9.

ecting America's reputation—and that of its citizens doing business there—from the constant aura of suspicion of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with 80% of its intelligence. Further intelligence in the underdeveloped world could be collected by State Department officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in dealing with the Nations involved.

Arguments against this policy include these: the agency is too important to U.S. interests to permit such withdrawal and the credibility of the withdrawal would be hard to establish, at least in the short run.

2. Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped world only for information, not manipulation: This policy would prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators, private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation for non-interference in the affairs of other countries. One might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Ransom that secret political operations could be used only as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security.

Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for espionage would leave the U.S. with a capability for manipulation; the same agents that are secretly providing information could secretly try to influence events. But there is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose and for the other.

Also, large scale operations would not be conducted under this rule. According to some reports, the Committee, chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the Bay of Pigs episode, recommended to President Kennedy (who apparently agreed) that the CIA be limited to operations requiring military equipment no larger or more complex than side arms—weapons which could be carried by individuals.

3. Require that relevant representatives of Congress be consulted before any clandestine operations, beyond those required for intelligence collection, are undertaken: It is an unresolved dispute, between the Executive and Legislative Branches, whether and when the Executive Branch may undertake operations affecting U.S. foreign policy without consulting Congress. If a clandestine political operation is important enough to take the always high risks of exposure, it should be important enough to consult Congress. These consultations can produce a new perspective on the importance of the operation. The

Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, one of the few who predicted accurately the political consequences of the Bay of Pigs operation.

4. Require that the ambassador be advised of covert operations in the nation to which he is accredited. Monitor compliance with Congressional oversight: Under the Kennedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a letter went to all embassies affirming the authority of the Ambassador over the representatives of CIA. But this authority is variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified and strengthened. One method of policing the order would involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he knew at least as much as did they about local covert activities. Another control would require that Assistant Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their region. In all these cases, political oversight and political perspective would be injected into operations that would otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of view.

Improper Use of Force

One morally and politically important imperative seems clear: Adopt and announce a firm rule against murder or torture. There are repeated and persistent reports that this rule does not exist. There was the murder by a green beret. There is the Phoenix program involving widespread assassination of "Vietcong agents"—many of which, it is reported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted that "when we catch one of them [an enemy agent], it becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and we do it with no holds barred."

There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor Marchetti, formerly executive assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA:

"The director would come back from the White House and shake his head and say 'The President is very, very upset about _____. We agreed that the only solution was _____. But of course that's impossible, we can't be responsible for a thing like that.' The second man would say the same thing to the third man, and on down through the station chief in some country until somebody went out and _____ and nobody was responsible." (Parade Magazine, "Quitting the CIA," by Henry Allen.)

Problems of Clandestine Domestic Operations

After the 1966 revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been financing the National Student Association, a variety of front organizations/and conduits were unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed the secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organizations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported individuals. The organizations included National Education Association, African-American Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation, and many others.

The way in which these organizations were controlled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion apparently characteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus, while distinguished participants in the Congress for Cultural Freedom and editors of its magazine, Encounter, evidently believed that the organizations were doing only what came naturally, the CIA official who set the entire covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this way:

"We had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Another Agent became an editor of Encounter. The agents could not only propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations but they could also suggest ways and means to solve the inevitable budgetary problems. Why not see if the needed money could be obtained from "American

CIA BECOMING A DURDENT?

While the institutional forms of political control appear effective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking. Even when the control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which CIA information and policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs.

Whether or not political control is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient CIA causes the U.S. Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."

Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy rather than the secret weapon it was intended to be.

--The New York Times, April 25, 1966

foundations?" (Saturday Evening Post 5/20/1967 Speaking Out, page 2)

President Johnson appointed a panel headed by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel members were HEW Secretary John Gardner (a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was to study the relationship between CIA and those "educational and private voluntary organizations" which operate abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such organizations could "play their proper and vital role." The Panel recommendations were as follows:

1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.
2. The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

On March 29, 1967, President Johnson said he accepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to implement it fully. He said he would give "serious consideration" to point 2 but apparently never implemented it.

When these operations were first proposed by Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting: "There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold war." Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the cold war," some would like to continue despite the regulations.

At least one influential former CIA official's thinking was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for this approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called "Establishment." For example, when the National Student Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now defunct, Look Magazine, were so incensed at general expressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in thirty years(!) defending the students. In such an atmosphere one must expect liberal (much less conservative) foundations and banks to cooperate whole-heartedly with the CIA whatever the cover.

In any case, what could such deeper cover be? In the first place, commercial establishment, or profit-making organizations are exempt from the ban. Hence, with or without the acquiescence of the officials of the company, CIA agents might be placed in strategic positions. It is possible also that organizations which seemed to be voluntary were actually incorporated in such a way as to be profit-making. Other possibilities include enriching indi-

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viduals by throwing business their way and having these individuals support suitable philanthropic enterprises.

To the extent that these arrangements reflect voluntary organizations, they pose the same problems which created the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by President Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct or indirect" support. Moreover, in the coming generation, we can expect a continuation of the existing trend toward whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most "indirect" support may eventually become known.

All of these deep cover arrangements are made much easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni association." These are persons who are known to the community through past service and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is involved. Examples from the past include these. A high official of CIA's predecessor—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—becomes head of the CIA-financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Department Intelligence becomes President of Operations and Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit which financed "studies" of Latin American electoral processes. (This official is simultaneously well placed to arrange studies of elections as the Director of the American Political Science Association!).

Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons trained in dissembling, distortion, and human manipulation, may be growing in our country. And the use of these kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable. During the Republican campaign for President, a memorandum went out to Republican college organizers which urged them to arrange a mock election and gave what seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the election.

This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia that divides Americans from one another. It makes them ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secretaries, and acquaintances—questions that are destructive of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in America. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)

As the public sense of cold war dissipates, the American distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or political manipulation sponsored by CIA will certainly deepen this sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best and most sophisticated college graduates will not be willing to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be discouraged as well. The result can change the character of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten American values.

One method, in the American tradition, for keeping CIA honest would be a public-interest organization of alumni of the intelligence community (and those who are serviced by intelligence in the Government). This public interest group would, as do so many others, offer its testimony to Congress on matters of interest to it—in this case, intelligence. The testimony might be given in public or in executive session, as appropriate; And constructive suggestions and criticisms could be made.

Such an organization would have a credibility and authority that no other group can have and a general knowledge of the relevant intelligence problems facing the nation and public. It goes without saying that no one in this organization, or communicating with it, would violate laws, or oaths, associated with classified information. The Federation of American Scientists' strategic weapons committee is an example of the feasibility and legitimacy by which a group of persons, well grounded in strategic arms problems can, without violating any rules concerning such information, make informed and useful policy pronouncements. Many persons consulted in the preparation of this newsletter endorsed this suggestion.

CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY?

There are still sensitive, progressive men in the CIA, but they are becoming scarcer by the moment. The Agency's career trainees no longer come from the Phi Beta ranks of Harvard, Yale, or Berkeley. The Agency is widely regarded on college campuses as the principal symbol of all that is wrong with our nation. "For the world as a whole," wrote Arnold Toynbee recently, "the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America. Whenever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it." Millions of college students and young professionals, the future "power elite" of the United States, would accept that judgment.

—R. Harris Smith, OSS *The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 382.

In any case, as the distaste for CIA grows, CIA has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do not wish to be tarnished by association with it. In one country, it is reported, CIA put funds into the bank deposits of a political party without its knowledge. But what if this were discovered? Obviously, CIA could lightly risk the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate, by trying to help them secretly.

TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies provided such parochial and biased intelligence estimates in the late fifties that they were removed in 1961 from the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and replaced by a new supervisory organization: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA's job was to coordinate all of the Defense Department's intelligence resources and analyses. Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA might become rivals and competitors; apparently, this has become the case.

By 1964, DIA had merged the intelligence publications of the armed services into publications of its own; launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA's "Central Intelligence Bulletin;" supplanted J-2, the intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the services in providing "order of battle" information and had basically reduced the services to the role of collecting raw intelligence.

A number of informed observers have nevertheless suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and that its functions could well be taken over by CIA. Others, with Pentagon experience, have noted that there is no way to prevent the military services' from having intelligence branches and—that being the case—DIA is necessary to sit on them and coordinate their conclusions. In any case, in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent normally disinterested analysis, DIA and the intelligence services pose real questions of redundancy, waste, service bias, and inefficiency.

Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress are convinced that there is such waste in Defense Department Intelligence. In 1971, the House Committee reported:

The committee feels that the intelligence operation of the Department of Defense has grown beyond the actual needs of the Department and is now receiving an inordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department. Redundancy is the watchword in many intelligence operations. The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations. Co-ordination is less effective than it should be. Far more material is collected than is essential. Material is collected which cannot be evaluated in a reasonable length of time and is therefore wasted. New intelligence means have become available, and have been incorporated into the program without offsetting reductions in old procedures.

In July, 1970, the Panel Chairman of the Nine Ribbon

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MR. SYMINGTON. As a junior member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as well as a member of the Appropriations Committee and the ranking member of Armed Services, I respectfully plead with my colleagues to allow me to receive in executive session enough intelligence information to in turn form an intelligent judgment on matters which so vitally affect our security; and so I can vote in committee and on the floor of the Senate on the basis of the facts. There have been several cases where I have not been able to do that in the past. In my opinion, this lack of disseminated information has cost the country a great deal of treasure and a number of American lives.

— from Congressional Record-Senate
November 23, 1971, S-19524

Report on Defense Department problems. Gilbert Fitzhugh, told a press conference: "I believe that the Pentagon suffers from too much intelligence. They can't use what they get because there is so much collected. It would almost be better that they didn't have it because it's difficult to find out what's important." He went on to suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail work, and too little looking ahead in the five-to-fifteen year range.

National Security Agency (NSA):

In 1952, a Presidential directive set up the National Security Agency as a separate agency inside the Defense Department. NSA's basic duties are to break codes of other Nations, to maintain the security of U.S. codes, and to perform intelligence functions with regard to electronic and radar emissions, etc. In 1956, it had 9,000 employees. Today, it is thought to have 15,000 and a budget well over a billion.

In August 1972, an apparently well-informed former employee of NSA wrote a long memoir for Ramparts Magazine. The article summarized the author's claims by saying:

"... NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet airplane—the numbers on the side of each plane, the name of the pilot in command; the precise longitude and latitude of every nuclear submarine; the whereabouts of nearly every Soviet VIP; the location of every Soviet missile base; every army division, battalion and company—its weaponry, commander and deployment. Routinely the NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and commercial radio traffic, including Soviet Air Defense, Tactical Air, and KGB forces. (It was the NSA that found Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communications intercept and analysis.) NSA cryptologic experts seek to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkable success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated signals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary voice and manual morse radio transmissions. Interception of Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to gauge quite precisely the effectiveness of Soviet Air Defense units. Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" every human voice used in radio transmissions and distinguish them from the voice of every other operator. The Agency's Electronic Intelligence Teams (ELINT) are capable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitted anywhere in the world and, from an analysis of the intercepted signal, identify the transmitter and physically reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown the size and sensitivity of the Agency's big ears, it is almost superfluous to point out that NSA monitors and records every trans-Atlantic telephone call."

A July 16, New York Times' report noted that "extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of many of [the article's] revelations." Experts had denied, however, the plausibility of the assertion that the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. □

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In each House of Congress, the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is supposed, in principle, to oversee CIA. In the House of Representatives, even the names of the Appropriations subcommittee members are secret. In the Senate, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee form a

WHAT DRIVES INTELLIGENCE?

We are going to have to take a harder look at intelligence requirements, because they drive the intelligence process. In so doing they create demands for resources. There is a tendency for requirements—once stated—to acquire immortality. One requirements question we will ask ourselves is whether we should maintain a world-wide data base, collected in advance, as insurance against the contingency that we may need some of this data in a particular situation. Much of this information can be required on very short notice by reconnaissance means. As for the remainder, we are going to have to accept the risk of not having complete information on some parts of the world. We haven't enough resources to cover everything, and the high priority missions have first call on what we do have.

— Hon. Robert F. Froehlke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, June 9, 1971 before Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, House of Representatives.

subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

The subcommittee of Armed Services on CIA has not met for at least two years—although Senator Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such a meeting. In 1971, Senator Stennis and Senator Ellender—then the Chairmen of the full Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA subcommittees) said they knew nothing about the CIA-financed war in Laos—surely CIA's biggest operation. (Congressional Record, November 23, 1971, pg. S19521 S19530.)

The Congressmen are understandably reluctant even to know about intelligence operations. Without publicity and public support, there is a limit to their influence over the events about which they hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constituency, the knowledge of secrets only makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or mishandled their responsibilities.

Approximately 150 resolutions have been offered in the Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence functions. The most common resolution has called for a Joint Committee on Intelligence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to review such matters might strengthen Congressional oversight.

Two more recent efforts, both sponsored by Senator Stuart Symington, have tried different tacks. One resolution called for a Select Committee on the Coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad; such a committee would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities in particular. Another approach called for limiting the U.S. intelligence expenditures of all kinds to \$4 billion.

Senator Clifford Case (Rep., N.J.) has sought to control the CIA by offering resolutions that simply apply to "any agency of the U.S. Government." These resolutions embody existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circumventing; e.g., he sought to prevent expenditure of funds for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily designed agency, which Congress empowered, and which Congress can control.

Congress has not only given the Executive Branch a blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947 requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government..." (italics added). As far as the legislative branch of "government" is concerned, this has not been done.

On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out an amendment (S. 2224), to the National Security Act explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports" the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of both Houses and to make special reports in response to their requests. The Committee proposal, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis upon the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic energy intelligence information. □

STAT

FAS: Reviving Lobby Battles ABM, Scientists' Apathy

After 20 years of limited activity, a once-outspoken science lobby group, the Federation of American Scientists, is making an effort to live up to its own slogan as "the voice of science on Capitol Hill."

In 1945, within months of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 3000 scientists across the country, who were connected with building the atomic bomb, banded together to prevent the military from gaining exclusive control of atomic energy. The issue at the FAS today is—in two words—arms control, with emphasis chiefly on the Antiballistic Missile System (ABM) and on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Vienna, which reopened this month.

The men who founded both FAS and its parent organization, the Federation of Atomic Scientists, in 1945, were mostly physical scientists. Among the principals were Leo Szilard, Lyle Borst, Harold C. Urey, and William Higinbotham. Many original members still sit on the FAS Board of Sponsors or on the governing group, the FAS National Council. Those original members still dominate FAS membership today. But it is now a quarter of a century later; that base-line 3000, which joined in 1945, has dwindled to approximately one-half, and FAS is seeking new and younger members among biologists, chemists, social scientists, and engineers.

The latest chapter in FAS history is a revival attempt, which began in 1968 and now, in terms of active organizing and lobbying, is almost 1 year old. During meetings in 1968 and 1969, the Council decided to expand itself, the issues it studied, and the FAS overall membership. Most important was the decision to hire a full-time lobbyist-director.



Jeremy J. Stone

These decisions were part of a spirit of activism felt by many scientists over the then-hot issues of Vietnam, military funding of research, and the ABM. But the social responsibility bonfires of 1968 have become somewhat dampened and smoky in the comparatively uneventful months of 1971. Thus, although FAS's lobbyist-director, Jeremy J. Stone, enters his second round of congressional lobbying this month on ABM and SALT with a warm welcome from his fellow opponents of ABM in Congress, FAS's drive to gain an active rank-and-file membership is meeting a somewhat cooler response.

The Scientists In 1945

From 1945 to 1947, the Federation of Atomic Scientists and its successor, the FAS, conducted a bustling lobby supported by 11 enthusiastic site groups at atomic laboratories and universities. These two groups are given a solid

share of the credit for the defeat of the May-Johnson Bill, which would have left the door open to military control of the atom, and for the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

The style of science lobbying was much the same then as now. The pyramidal structure of the science profession enables a few, well-known scientists to speak publicly with a weight disproportionate to their number. Thus, the postwar FAS lobbies consisted mainly of private meetings between congressmen and the most prestigious scientists who could be drawn to Washington to talk on a given question.

These years also saw the development, with FAS assistance, of one of

the most enduring science-government institutions, the seminar breakfast, where one or two scientists—whenever possible, well-known ones—explain the technical intricacies and policy implications of an issue to a privately convened group of congressmen.*

But after that early activist period—in which FAS members even consulted with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer on a movie about the bomb titled "The Beginning or the End"—FAS became what its older members variously describe now as "a sleeping giant," "geared only for crisis action," or "virtually nonexistent."

But although FAS's profile appeared to have sunk so low that, to some people, it was barely visible, FAS did a number of things between the late 1940's and 1968: It backed the creation of the National Science Foundation; it reported on chemical and biological warfare before they became a public issue; it helped obtain more freedom for foreign scientists' entry into the United States and for U.S. scien-

to traveling abroad. And during the McCarthy period, a committee on security aided scientists and nonscientists whose loyalty was under fire.

Two important campaigns in matters atomic during this so-called "dormant" period were a successful campaign to have the United Nations appoint an international committee to study the effects of radioactive fallout in 1955, and a breakfast seminar program in 1961 on civil defense.

FAS also tried to protect the interests of its constituency, the scientists. When Allen V. Astin, director of the National Bureau of Standards, was threatened with the loss of his job as a result of the NBS stand on battery additives, FAS took part in his defense. When Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the AEC, was nominated to be Secretary of Commerce in 1958, FAS joined the opposition to the nomination.

A full-time office in Washington was maintained for most of the 1950's, which put out the *FAS Newsletter*, a cousin publication to *Science and Public Affairs: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, also born during the postwar atomic scientists' movement. During the 1960's attorney Daniel Singer, general counsel to the FAS, served as a part-time Washington coordinator.

The scientists who formed FAS in 1945 were primarily physical scientists

* See Alice Kimball Smith, *A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America 1945-47*, (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965) (Library of Congress Catalogue No. 65-17300).

whose galvanizing issue was the bomb; by 1968, the most active members on the Council were not these but a younger group whose field of interest was strategic weapons and the arms race.

According to Leonard Rodberg, in 1967 and 1968, when scientists in Seattle and Chicago revived local FAS chapters to fight proposed local ABM installations, the Council began to think of the whole FAS as a potential vehicle for a national campaign on arms race issues.

FAS in Transition

But such a drive needed a full-time lobbyist in Washington, and, as an organization historically composed of and run by scientists, the rather improbable hybrid of a scientist-lobbyist seemed best. In the fall of 1969, the Council decided to find a director and double EAS's yearly dues of \$7.50 to pay him. Leonard Rodberg, ^{Approved For Release} a scientist at the University of Maryland and now at the Insti-

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But the only scientists-lobbyists presented by the Rodberg group were young activist graduate students or very recent Ph.D.'s. These apparently left the Council convinced that the FAS as a group should not take a New Left route.

"FAS was at a crossroads," Rodberg recalls, "if to revive, and how to revive. It was decided to follow the model of early days and do the kind of elitist lobbying it had done before."

After talks between John O. Rasmussen, then chairman of FAS and professor of chemistry at Yale, Leo Sartori, associate professor of physics at M.I.T., and Jeremy J. Stone, then at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington and author of two books on the arms race, Stone was chosen as FAS's full-time director.

Jeremy Stone, 35, is a mathematician turned arms specialist who is known for his nimble-tongued debating ability on strategic weapons questions. His career as a mathematician began with a Ph.D. in 1960 from Stanford, followed by 2 years at the Stanford Research Institute and 2 years at the then-nascent Hudson Institute. Developing an interest in strategic policy, Stone taught both arms control studies and math for 2 years at Pomona College, spent 2 years at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, and one academic year at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has written two books—*Con-*

taining the Arms Race, in 1967, and Strategic Persuasion, in 1969.† Now, as director of FAS he puts out the *FAS Newsletter*.‡ He is the son of I. F. Stone, publisher of *I. F. Stone's Weekly*. While on his grant at the Council on Foreign Relations, he became interested, he says, in lobbying. He had been active in FAS in the late '60's along with Rodberg and was chairman of the nominating committee to bolster the Council. Thus, Stone emerged as someone known to the Council, who also knew the FAS and who, moreover, could fill the double bill of scientist-lobbyist.

He took office on 1 July 1970, just as Rasmussen stepped aside as chairman and Herbert F. York became the new chairman. York was formerly director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and Director of

nedy, York is author of the newest
comparative and general book on the
arms race, *Race to Oblivion*, § and is
now Chancellor of the University of
California at La Jolla.

Together Stone, as indefatigable leg man for the organization, and York, as the impeccably credentialled expert at the top of the academic heap, have made a formidable team--and the key to the rise of FAS's profile on Capitol Hill.

Stone gives York much of the credit for this. York's DOD credentials and imposing appearance, he says, make him the ideal expert congressional witness. He says, "If I shake my head and say 'It'll cost \$3 billion,' people just look at each other and say 'Who's this guy?' But if Herb York shakes his head and says, 'It'll cost \$3 billion,' everybody just nods and says, 'Oh really? That much?'"

Voices on Capitol Hill

The largest lobby on Capitol Hill concerned with ABM is the Pentagon itself, which can use its prestige, resources, and vast national organization to persuade Congress that the ABM should go ahead. The White House also spends considerable political capital in Congress in the course of ABM lobbying.

In addition, there are promilitary groups such as the American Security

¹ Containing the Arab: Race (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Strategic Persuasion (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1968).

² Obtained at Federation of American Scientists,
203 C St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20002.

Race to Oblivion (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970).

Council, which raised, for example, \$200,000 in a single preelection mailing last fall. The strategy used was to send out 2 million pieces of mail offering a "national security index," which rated all congressmen on their voting records on security issues and which showed that about a dozen men up for re-election had "a national security rating of zero."

Until FAS opened its one-room, one-secretary office near the Capitol last July, there was a single major anti-ABM lobby, the Council for a Livable World (CLW), founded in 1962 by the late physicist Leo Szilard. CLW is sometimes credited with having "made" ABM an issue by undertaking the enormous task of educating congressmen on the ins and outs of strategic policy — arguments which to the layman usu-
0090020006-7ing of a very complex poker game in all the tongues of Babel.

Also in the field against ABM were SANUS, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and the United World Federalists.

Entering rather late onto this scene in July, FAS quickly gained publicity and credibility, both for the novelty of the scientists' lobby and because of Stone's personal knowledge of strategic weapons data and his ability to adjust arguments to the level of practicality required by both speechwriters and politicians themselves. Stone also made judicious use of his congressional and academic contacts to help well-known scientists such as York, George B. Kistiakowsky, science adviser to President Eisenhower, George Rathjens, visiting professor of political science at M.I.T., Herbert Scoville, Jr., formerly assistant director of the disarmament agency, and Marvin Goldberger, professor of physics at Princeton, to testify. Most such witnesses represent only themselves when they testify; of late, however, Stone himself has testified on behalf of the FAS.

Thomas A. Halsted, Stone's counterpart at CLW, says that last summer, at the time Stone first appeared on the Hill, the CLW was mainly concerned with influencing the fall elections and had less time and resources to devote to the ABM fight. Moreover, he says, the public was less concerned about ABM than during previous fights. Nonetheless, Stone's tiny operation helped coordinate what opposition there was and kept the issue alive and kicking on the House and Senate floors.

Thus, FAS joined the club of anti-ABM congressional staffers, politicians, outside experts, and lobbyists—a clique described by one reporter as "a mutual admiration and reinforcing society" which tries to head off the vicissitudes of politics and keep everybody going along the same track.

Money and Members

But FAS's rejuvenation could be short-lived if two aspects of the organization fail to revive: money and membership. When it comes to political muscle, the most powerful influences on congressmen are groups which can deliver campaign funds or votes for candidates. This is one reason for CLW's success; its 12,000 active sponsors raised over \$300,000 for candidates in last fall's campaign. But FAS can deliver neither money nor votes. It hardly has funds to build its own membership, let alone to give away to candidates.

When the FAS National Council decided to hire a full-time director, it was understood that reviving the national organization would be part of his mandate. Stone has recaptured the flavor of FAS's early lobby. But he has yet to work the second miracle of breathing life into the near-defunct national organization.

Stone first aimed to double membership—then at 1500--within a year. But before he was hired, the dues had been doubled to \$15 yearly, and renewals were dropping. Mailings to purchased lists of scientists have netted a respectable return of 1 percent; they have brought Stone 800 new members to date. He now predicts that at the end of his first year on 1 July 1971, he will have brought something above this increase of 50 percent.

But persuading scientists to pay \$15 to receive a newsletter is one thing; persuading them to generate local action is another. Even though membership is swelling on paper, FAS local chapters are limp. Even the Seattle and Chicago groups who fought the ABM locally in 1969 are thought to be less active now.

A volunteer who aided Stone last summer is setting up a second FAS national network: Technical Advisory Committees to Influence Congress (TACTIC). So far, B. Michael Casper, associate professor of physics at Carleton College, has enlisted 500 scientists in 225 congressional districts—or about half in the nation—to form local TACTIC groups to talk to their representatives and senators about science-related issues when they revisit their home districts. The aim is to exert precisely the same kind of local pressures that were so effective in the postwar years of FAS. But so far, the groups have been inactive. Moreover, one Council member who talked with *Science* at some length about FAS failed to mention that he had been invited to chair a local TACTIC group. Casper himself

says that the whole project, launched on a budget of \$1000, is too embryonic for evaluation.

Two other pieces of the national FAS include the Council itself, which Rodberg says has become less active since appointing Stone. Another is the so-called Issue committee, set up by Stone to research and publish on FAS issues. On paper, FAS has seven issue committees—but most of them have only one member, a chairman. Only the strategic systems committee, headed by Scoville, has consistently worked on ABM; another one on chemical and bio-

logical warfare is also somewhat active. To broaden its base, FAS has tried to get nonphysicists in council and committee posts. FAS now is self-described as "a national organization of natural and social scientists and engineers." Both Stone and the Council agree that FAS should not be a one-issue organization, and, by broadening its membership and participation, Stone hopes to broaden also the range of issues it will deal with in Congress. Thus, it can become the "voice of science on Capitol Hill."

FAS and SESPA

But one group it is not likely to add is the radical younger scientists whose principal organ is Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA). Michael H. Goldhaber, assistant professor of physics at the University of Arizona, a SESPA founder and member of FAS's National Council, says that, at one time, there was a chance SESPA would "fold up and join" FAS. But both groups are glad nothing happened, he says. "There is room for both a SESPA and a FAS."

He says that many young scientists see the FAS Council as "big, fat partners of the Pentagon," who believe too much in "the Washington approach" to problem solving. He argues, for example, that ABM opponents first claimed that ABM wouldn't work—a technocratic argument, he said, which only had the effect of the Pentagon's proposal of an ABM which would work. "An ABM which works is even worse."

[TACTIC], B. M. Casper, Physics Department, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. 55057.

Goldhaber says that there are many radicals in science who "don't speak the language of FAS." "Even to talk about continuing to build weapons at this point is an insane way of speaking." And these people are, rightfully, part of SESPA, he says.

But just as there has been a lull among activities on the SESPA wing of science this year, there has been apathy among the more "established" scientists as well. As Bernard Feld, professor of physics at M.I.T., president of the Council for a Livable World, and FAS Council member summarized: "The real question is whether people feel the country is in a crisis situation of sufficient magnitude so that people will do the kinds of things FAS would do."

—DEBORAH SHAFLEY

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